A general model of a pure exchange differential information economy is studied. In this economic model, the space of states of nature is a complete probability measure space, the space of agents is a finite measure space, and the commodity space is the Euclidean space. Under some appropriate and standard assumptions on agents' characteristics, results on continuity and measurability of the aggregate preferred correspondence similar to that of Aumann [8] are established. These results together with other techniques are then employed to prove the existence of a maximin rational expectations equilibrium (maximin REE) of the economic model.
Introduction
When traders come to a market with different information about the items to be traded, the resulting market prices may reveal to some traders information originally available only to others. The possibility for such inferences rests upon traders having expectations of how equilibrium prices are related to initial information. This endogenous relationship was considered by Radner in his seminal paper [26] , where he introduced the concept of a rational expectations equilibrium by imposing on agents the Bayesian (subjective expected utility) decision doctrine. Under the Bayesian decision making, agents maximize their subjective expected utilities conditioned on their own private information and also on the information that the equilibrium prices generate. The resulting equilibrium allocations are measurable with respect to the private information of each individual and also with respect to the information the equilibrium prices generate and clear the market for every state of nature. In papers [1, 2, 26] , conditions on the existence of a Bayesian rational expectations equilibrium (REE) were studied and some generic existence results were proved. However, Kreps [22] provided an example that shows that a Bayesian REE may not exist universally. In addition, a Bayesian REE may fail to be fully Pareto optimal and incentive compatible and may not be implementable as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of an extensive form game, refer to [15] for more details.
It was pointed out in [21] that the market hypothesis fails if the space of states of nature is of a dimension higher than that of the price simplex. Thus, in generic existence theorems of Allen [1, 2] and Radner [26] , the assumption on the space of states of nature being finite or of sufficiently low dimension relative to the dimension of price simplex is essential. However, it was shown in [20] that if the space of states of nature is of a dimension strictly higher than that of the price simplex, then for a residual set of economies there is a rational expectations equilibrium which is given by a two-to-one and almost discontinuous price function. When the dimensions of both spaces coincide, as mentioned in [3] , the existence of an equilibrium fails in finite economies. If the space of agents is a unit interval consisting of imperfectly and perfectly informed agents, under the hypothesis of suitably disperse forecasts, it was shown in [3] that for each state of nature the aggregate excess demand is continuous on the price simplex and satisfies Walras' law. This fact allowed Allen to apply a fixed point theorem to obtain the market clearing price vector for each state of nature and obtain the existence of an ε-rational expectations equilibrium for all ε > 0. The convergence as ε → 0 holds for some cases in which open counterexamples to the existence of rational expectations equilibria are known. In the same year, Allen [4] also considered two types of agents (informed and uninformed) and prices carried only incomplete information, when prices conveyed some information from informed agents to uninformed agents. By applying a fixed point theorem, she obtained a new approximate non-revealing rational expectations equilibrium in the sense that the total discrepancy between demand and supply is small. Allen [5] further showed the existence of a rational expectations equilibrium with (strong) ε-market clearing in the sense that the discrepancy between demand and supply is zero for all but one commodity for which the value can be made arbitrarily small.
In a recent paper [13] , de Castro et al. introduced a new notion of REE by a careful examination of Kreps' example of the nonexistence of a Bayesian REE. In this formulation, the Bayesian decision making adopted in the papers of [1] and [26] was abandoned and replaced by the maximin expected utility (MEU) (see [14] ).
2 In this new setup, agents maximize their MEU conditioned on their own private information and also on the information the equilibrium prices have generated. Contrary to a Bayesian REE, the resulting maximin REE may not be measurable with respect to the private information of each individual or the information that the equilibrium prices generate.
Although Bayesian REE and maximin REE coincide in some special cases (e.g., fully revealing Bayesian REE and maximin REE), these two concepts are in general not equivalent. Nonetheless, the introduction of the MEU into the general equilibrium modeling enables de Castro et al. to prove that a maximin REE exists universally under the standard continuity and concavity assumptions on the utility functions of agents. Furthermore, they showed that a maximin REE is incentive compatible and efficient. Note that in the economic model considered in [13] , it is assumed that there are finitely many states of nature and finitely many agents, and the commodity space is finite-dimensional. Thus, one of open questions is whether their existence theorem can be extended to more general cases. The main motivation of this paper is to tackle this question. We study a general economic model of a pure exchange differential information economy whose space of states of nature is a complete probability measure space, and whose space of agents is a finite measure space. Under appropriate and standard assumptions on agents' characteristics, the existence of a maximin rational expectations equilibrium (maximin REE) in this general economic model is established. To prove our existence result, instead of applying the approaches used in [1, 2, 26] , we modify and extend Aumann's approach in [8] for a deterministic economic model to our economic model. One of the key ingredients in this approach is the concept of aggregate preferred correspondence. This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, mathematical preliminaries and key facts used in this paper are presented. The economic model and assumptions are introduced and explained in Section 3. In Section 4, we modify and extend Aumann's concept of agents' aggregate preferred correspondence to our model. We establish some results on continuity and measurability of the aggregate preferred correspondence. The main results in this section are new and different from those of Aumann in [8] for deterministic economic model, since our model is a differential information economy and we also drop Aumann's assumption on the existence of an assignment that commodity-wise saturates each agent's desire. Moreover, these results are also key techniques for us to prove the existence of a maximin rational expectations equilibrium of the economic model in Section 5. Finally, in Section 6, results and techniques appeared in this paper are compared with relevant results in the literature.
Mathematical preliminaries
Let G be a non-empty set. On -dimensional Euclidean space R , two different but equivalent norms · ∞ and · 1 are used in this paper, where
is a non-empty (resp. closed, compact, convex) subset of R for all x ∈ G. The graph of F , denoted by Gr F , is defined by
For x ∈ R and A ∈ 2 R \ {∅}, define dist(x, A) = inf{d(x, y): y ∈ A}, where d is the Euclidean metric on R . Let K 0 (R ) be the family of non-empty compact subsets of R . Recall that the Hausdorff metric H on K 0 (R ) is defined such that for any two A, B ∈ K 0 (R ),
For equivalent definitions of H, refer to [6] . The Hausdorff metric topology T H on K 0 (R ) is the topology generated by H. For a closed subset M of R , K 0 (M ) and the Hausdorff metric H on K 0 (M ) can be defined similarly. If G is a topological space, a non-empty compact-valued correspondence
This statement still holds when R is replaced with a closed subset M of R . Let {A n : n 1} be a sequence of non-empty subsets of R . A point x ∈ R is called a limit point of {A n : n 1} if there exist N 1 and x n ∈ A n for each n N such that {x n : n N } converges to x. The set of limit points of {A n : n 1} is denoted by Li A n . Similarly, a point x ∈ R is called a cluster point of {A n : n 1} if there exist positive integers n 1 < n 2 < · · · and for each k an x k ∈ A n k such that {x k : k 1} converges to x. The set of cluster points of {A n : n 1} is denoted by Ls A n . It is clear that Li A n ⊆ Ls A n , and both Ls A n and Li A n are closed (possibly empty) sets. If Ls A n ⊆ Li A n , then Li A n = Ls A n = A is called the limit of the sequence {A n : n 1}. Note that Ls A n = Ls A n and Li A n = Li A n . Hence, if A is the limit of {A n : n 1}, then A is also the limit of {A n : n 1}. If A and all A n 's are closed and contained in a compact subset M ⊆ R , then it is well known that Li A n = Ls A n = A if and only if {A n : n 1} converges to A in the Hausdorff metric topology on K 0 (M ).
Let (T, Σ, μ) be a measure space and {F n : n 1}, F : (T, Σ, μ) ⇒ R be correspondences. Recall that F is said to be lower measurable if
If a selection f of F is measurable (resp. integrable), then it is called a measurable (resp. an integrable) selection. Let S F denote the set of integrable selections of F . It is well known that a non-empty closed-valued correspondence F : (T, Σ, μ) ⇒ R is lower measurable if and only if there exists a sequence of measurable selections {f n : n 1} of F such that for all t ∈ T , F (t) = {f n (t): n 1}. If all F n s are non-empty closed-valued, lower measurable and at least one of F n s is compact-valued, then n 1 F n is lower measurable, refer to [19] . If all F n s are integrably bounded by the same function, then
If (S, S , ν) is another measure space and f :
Let M ⊆ R be endowed with the relative Euclidean topology, and (Y, ) be a metric space
is measurable for all x ∈ M , and f (t, ·) is continuous for all t ∈ T . It is known that any Carathéodory function is jointly measurable with respect to the Borel structure on M . The integration of F over T in the sense of [7] is a subset of R , defined as
If F is non-empty closed-valued and integrably bounded, then T F dμ is compact, refer to [18, p. 73] .
The following special case of the Kuratowski-Ryll-Nardzewski measurable selection theorem will be used in this paper. For more general versions of the measurable selection theorem, see [23] or [19] .
Theorem 2.1. If F : (T, Σ, μ) → R is a lower measurable correspondence with nonempty closed-valued values, then it has a measurable selection.

Differential information economies
In this paper, a model of a pure exchange economy E with differential information is considered. The space of states of nature is a complete probability measure space (Ω, F , ν). The space of agents is a measure space (T, Σ, μ) with 0 < μ(T ) < +∞. The commodity space is the -dimensional Euclidean space R , and the positive cone R + is the consumption set for each agent t ∈ T in every state of nature ω ∈ Ω. Each agent t ∈ T is associated with her/his characteristics (F t , U(t, ·,·), a(t, ·), Q t ), where F t is the sub-σ-algebra of F generated by a partition Π t of Ω representing the private information
state-dependent utility function of t and a(t, ·)
: Ω → R + is the state-dependent initial endowment of t and Q t is a probability measure on Ω giving the prior belief of t. The economy extends over two time periods τ = 1, 2. At the ex ante stage (τ = 0), only the above description of the economy is a common knowledge.
At the interim stage τ = 1, agent t only knows that the realized state of nature belongs to the event
where F t (ω * ) is the unique member of Π t containing the true state of nature ω * at τ = 2. At the ex post stage (τ = 2), agents execute the trades according to the contract agreed at period τ = 1, and consumption takes place. The coordinate-wise order on R is denoted by and the symbol x 0 means that x is an interior point of R + , and x > 0 means that x 0 but x = 0. Let L 1 (μ, R + ) be the set of equivalent classes of Lebesgue integrable functions from T to R + . An allocation in E is a function f :
The following standard assumptions on agents' characteristics shall be used:
Remark 3.1. To prove our main result in Section 5, we need a classical existence result of Hildenbrand in [18] , which requires the concavity of utilities. Note that since μ(T ) < +∞, we can decompose T into a disjoint union of two parts, namely, the atomless part T 0 and another part T 1 consisting of at most countably many atoms. In fact, in order to guarantee that the existence result of Hildenbrand in [18] holds, for each ω ∈ Ω, we only need the concavity of utility U (t, ω, ·) for t ∈ T 1 . But, for the sake of simplicity, for each ω ∈ Ω, we assume the concavity of utility U (t, ω, ·) for all t ∈ T . Let Δ be the simplex of price systems in the deterministic case normalized so that their sum is 1, i.e., Δ = p ∈ R + : p 0 and
Furthermore, we shall equip Δ with the relative Euclidean topology and the Borel structure B(Δ) generated by this topology. The budget correspondence B :
Walrasian equilibrium of the deterministic economy E (ω), given by
Define a function δ :
γ(t, ω, p) .
Define the correspondence X :
and
.
Furthermore, it can be easily checked that
) is continuous on the non-empty compact set B(t, ω, p). Thus, one has
, then we can choose y ∈ R + such that y > 0 and
, which is a contradiction.
Following [8] , we call C X (t, ω, p) the preferred set of agent t at the price p and state of nature ω, and call T C X (·, ω, p) dμ the aggregate preferred set at the price p and state of nature ω. Moreover, we call
the aggregate preferred correspondence.
Remark 3.3. Note that our notations are slightly different from those of Aumann in [8] . In fact, the preferred set and the aggregate preferred set defined in [8] are equivalent to our sets C(t, ω, p) and T C(·, ω, p) dμ, respectively. But, the preferred set C X (t, ω, p) and the aggregate preferred set T C X (·, ω, p) dμ defined in this paper are similar to the sets D p (t) and T D p (·) dμ in [8] , respectively. In [8] , to define D p (t), Aumann used the following additional assumption:
There is an allocation 4 v such that each agent t's desire is commodity-wise saturated at v(t).
In this paper, to avoid this assumption, we replace D p (t) and T D p (·) dμ in [8] with C X (t, ω, p) and
Properties of the aggregate preferred correspondence
In this section, we discuss some descriptive properties of the aggregate preferred correspondence. These properties will be used to derive the existence of a maximin rational expectations equilibrium in our economic model. 
is non-empty closed for all t ∈ T . By the lower measurability of B(·, ω, p), there exists a sequence {f n : n 1} of measurable functions from (T, Σ, μ) to R + such that B(t, ω, p) = {f n (t): n 1} for all t ∈ T . For each n 1, define a correspondence C n : T ⇒ R + by letting ω, x) . This implies that x / ∈ C n 0 (t), and thus C(t, ω, p) = n 1 C n (t) for all t ∈ T . Fix n 1, and define h :
Clearly, h is Carathéodory. Similar to Proposition 4.1, one can show that C n is lower measurable. Since X(·, ω, p) is compact-valued and , as b(·, ω, p) is so. Since C X (·, ω, p) is closed-valued and integrably bounded,
In [8] , the continuity of T D p (t) in p was proved. As shown in the next theorem, with the help of Proposition 4.2, we are able to establish the continuity of our aggregate preferred correspondence
ξ(t, ω) = d(t, ω), . . . , d(t, ω) .
Define M (ω) by
Since X(·, ω, p n ) and X(·, ω, p) are bounded from above by ξ(·, ω), then the sets T C X (·, ω, p n ) dμ and T C X (·, ω, p) dμ are contained in the compact subset M (ω) of R + . Thus, one only needs to show that
which is equivalent to
The above equation can be verified in two steps. First, one verifies
To do this, it is enough to verify that Ls C X (t, ω, p n ) ⊆ C X (t, ω, p) for any t ∈ T . Pick t ∈ T and x ∈ Ls C X (t, ω, p n ). Then, there exist positive integers n 1 < n 2 < n 3 < · · · and for each k a point x k ∈ C X (t, ω, p n k ) such that {x k : k 1} converges to x. It is obvious that x ∈ X(t, ω, p). If x / ∈ C X (t, ω, p), by the continuity of U (t, ω, ·), one can choose some y ∈ R + such that p,
y < p, a(t, ω) and U (t, ω, y) > U(t, ω, x).
By the Hausdorff continuity of X(t, ω, ·), {X(t, ω, p n k ): k 1} converges to X(t, ω, p) in the Hausdorff metric topology. Since y ∈ X(t, ω, p), there exists a sequence {y k : k 1} such that y k ∈ X(t, ω, p n k ) for all k 1 and {y k : k 1} converges to y. It follows that U (t, ω, y k ) > U(t, ω, x k ) and p n k , y k < p n k , a(t, ω) for all sufficiently large k, which is a contradiction with x k ∈ C X (t, ω, p n k ) for all k 1. Therefore, one must have x ∈ C X (t, ω, p). Secondly, one needs to verify 
It suffices to verify that
C X (t, ω, p) ⊆ Li C X (t, ω, p n ) for all t ∈ T . Fix t ∈ T and d ∈ C X (t, ω, p). If d = b(t, ω, p), then b(t, ω, p n ) ∈ C X (t,i 0 n k : k 1} of {d i 0 n : n 1} such that d i 0 n k / ∈ C X (t, ω, p n k ). Let b k ∈ B(t, ω, p n k ) and U (t, ω, b k ) > U(t, ω, d i 0 n k ) for all k 1. Then {b k : k 1}
has a subsequence converging to some b ∈ B(t, ω, p). (A 2 ) and (A 3 ) imply
which contradicts with d ∈ C X (t, ω, p). To complete the proof, note that the previous claim implies that for
The next result is crucial for the existence theorem in Section 5. In its proof, the following characterization of lower measurability of correspondences in [6] is used: A correspondence F : (Ω, F , ν) ⇒ R + is lower measurable if and only if for all y ∈ R + , dist(y, F (·)) : (Ω, F , ν) → R + is a measurable function.
Proof. Fix p ∈ Δ. Since a and U are Σ ⊗ F -measurable and Σ ⊗ F ⊗ B(R + )-measurable respectively, by the argument of a result in [27, p. 131] , there exist two sequences {a n : n 1} and {ψ n : n 1} of Σ ⊗ F -measurable and Σ ⊗ F ⊗ B(R + )-measurable functions respectively such that {a n : n 1} uniformly converges to a on T × Ω and {ψ n : n 1} uniformly converges to U on T × Ω × R + . For each n 1, write a n and ψ n as
where e i ∈ R + , v i ∈ R, and {T
Choose N 1 such that a n − a ∞ < 1 for all n N . By the measurability of a n (·, ω), a n (·, ω) ∈ L 1 (μ, R + ) for all ω ∈ Ω and all n 1 (replacing a n for all 1 n < N by some constant functions, if necessary). Let
p, a n (t, ω) and
For every n 1, define the correspondence
To verify the claim, one needs to verify that for all g ∈ L 1 (μ,
. This implies for all ω ∈ Ω, Γ (·, ω) is integrable. Thus, Θ(g, ·) is measurable and Claim 1 is verified if one shows for all ω ∈ Ω,
which is a contradiction.
for all ω ∈ Ω, and
Since ξ is norm-continuous, by Claim 1,
This verifies the claim.
To see this, for each ω ∈ Ω, put
. , δ(p) .
Then, C X (·, ω, p) and all C X n (·, ω) are bounded from above by α(·, ω). Now, it suffices to verify that for all t ∈ T ,
Maximin rational expectations equilibrium
A price system of E is a measurable function π : (Ω, F , ν) → Δ. Let σ(π) be the smallest sub-algebra of F such that π is measurable and let G t = F t ∨ σ(π). For each ω ∈ Ω, let G t (ω) denote the smallest element of G t containing ω. Given t ∈ T , ω ∈ Ω and a price system π, let B REE (t, ω, π) be defined by
The maximin utility of each agent t ∈ T with respect to G t at x : Ω → R + in state ω ∈ Ω, denoted by U REE (t, ω, x) , is defined by
Comparing with U REE (t, ·,·), the function U (t, ·,·) is sometimes called the ex post utility of agent t.
Remark 5.1. The maximin utility formation in the sense of REE was introduced by de Castro et al. in [13] , where Ω is finite. In this case, for each t ∈ T , Π t is a partition of Ω consisting of only finitely many elements and σ(π) is generated by a partition Π π also consisting of only finitely many elements. Thus, the σ-algebra
In our case, Ω is fairly general, particularly, can be infinite. The structure of σ(π) can be complicated. If Ω is infinite, σ(π) may not be generated by a partition. But, for each ω ∈ Ω, there always exists a (unique) smallest element in σ(π) containing ω. This means that there also exists a (unique) smallest element G t (ω) in G t containing ω. Since G t (ω) can be infinite, U REE (t, ω, x) is allowed to take the value −∞ if the above infimum does not exist. This adaptation will not affect the proof of Theorem 5.5 below.
Definition 5.2. (See [13] .) Given a feasible allocation f and a price system π, the pair (f, π) is called a maximin rational expectations equilibrium (abbreviated as maximin REE)
In this case, f is called a maximin rational expectations allocation, and the set of such allocations is denoted by MREE(E ).
Let x : Ω → R + be G t -measurable. Recall that the Bayesian expected utility of agent t with respect to
When Ω is finite, G t is generated by the partition Π t ∨ Π π . Then,
,
Definition 5.3. (See [1, 26] .) Given a feasible allocation f and a price system π, the pair (f, π) is called a Bayesian rational expectations equilibrium (abbreviated as Bayesian REE) of E if
is defined by
Remark 5.4. Definition 5.2 indicates that at a maximin rational expectations allocation, each individual maximizes his maximin utility conditioned on his private information and the information generated by the equilibrium prices, subject to the budget constraint. Definition 5.3 indicates that at a Bayesian rational expectations allocation, each individual maximizes his Bayesian utility conditioned on his private information and the information generated by the equilibrium prices, subject to the budget constraint. The resulting equilibrium allocations are measurable with respect to the private information of each individual and also with respect to the information the equilibrium prices generate. For detailed discussions on relations and comparison between Bayesian REE and Maximin REE, refer to [13] .
It is well known that a Bayesian rational expectations equilibrium may not exist. It only exists in a generic sense and not universally. Moreover, it fails to be fully Pareto optimal and incentive compatible and it is not implementable as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of an extensive form game, see [15] . In [13] , de Castro et al. showed that MREE(E ) = ∅ when Ω and T are finite. Our next theorem extends their result to a more general case.
By Proposition 4.2, Z is non-empty compact-valued. In addition, by Theorem 4.3, Z is also Hausdorff continuous in p. By Corollary 4.5 and (
Note that E (ω) has a Walrasian equilibrium for each ω ∈ Ω. This implies that F is non-empty valued. Furthermore, by Hausdorff continuity of Z(ω, ·), F is also closed-valued. Since Gr a(t, ω) for μ-a.e. t ∈ T and all ω ∈ Ω. Thus, f (t, ω) ∈ B(t, ω,π(ω)) for μ-a.e. t ∈ T and all ω ∈ Ω. For every ω ∈ Ω, define T ω ⊆ T by
Then, μ(T ω ) = μ(T ) for all ω ∈ Ω. Next, for every ω ∈ Ω and every t ∈ T \ T ω , as B(t, ω,π(ω)) ∩ C(t, ω,π(ω)) = ∅, one can pick a point
and then define a functionf :
It is obvious thatf (t, ω) ∈ B(t, ω,π(ω)) ∩ C(t, ω,π(ω)) for all (t, ω) ∈ T × Ω. Assume that there are an agent t 0 ∈ T , a state of nature ω t 0 ∈ Ω and an element y(t 0 , ·) ∈ B REE (t 0 , ω t 0 ,π) such that
Then, one obtains
). This verifies that (f,π) is a maximin rational expectations equilibrium of E . 2
Remark 5.6. In this remark, we explain how our maximin utility is related to that of Gilboa and Schmeidler in [14] , and whether Theorem 5.5 can be extended to the framework of Gilboa and Schmeidler. For any
The set of beliefs of agent t at state ω is defined by
First, we claim that for any F -measurable function x :
For convenience, we put
Since a U (t, ω , x(ω )) for all ω ∈ G t (ω), for any ν ∈ Δ(G t (ω)), we have a
This is a contradiction, which verifies the claim. Therefore, in our model, the maximin utility can be re-formulated as
under the F -measurability assumption of x. Once we realize this, then we can see how Theorem 5.5 can be further extended to the framework of either maxmin expected utility in [14] or variational representation of preferences in [24] under the same assumption. Indeed, if we define
as the maximin utility function, where K is any non-empty, closed and convex subset of Δ(G t (ω)) as in Gilboa and Schmeidler [14] , then Theorem 5.5 still holds. To see this, we only need to verify the last part of the proof of the theorem. Suppose there are an agent t 0 ∈ T , a state of nature ω t 0 ∈ Ω and an element
Then, we can find a ν 0 ∈ K such that
So, there exists a B ∈ F G t 0 (ω t 0 ) with ν 0 (B) > 0 such that
for all ω t 0 ∈ B, which contradicts withf (t 0 , ω t 0 ) ∈ C(t 0 , ω t 0 ,π(ω t 0 )). The other case can be verified similarly.
Conclusion
The first application of maximin expected utilities to the general equilibrium theory with differential information appeared in [11] , where an existence theorem for a Walrasian equilibrium in an economy was established. However, their MEU formulation is in the ex ante sense, and REE notion was not considered.
It is well known that Walrasian expectations equilibrium may not exist in a differential information economy with Bayesian expected utilities and infinitely many states, see Podczeck et al. [25] . With infinitely many states, Herves-Beloso et al. [16] showed equilibrium existence assuming that the finitely many agents observe a public and a private signal. The publicly observed signal may take infinitely many values but private signals only take finitely many values. That is, the asymmetries among agents' information affect only a finite number of states. The major difference between the model in [16] and ours is that our allocations are not privately measurable, comparing with that in the case of Walrasian expectations equilibrium. Hence, we restrict our attention only on the ex-post utility (that is, we are in a finite dimensional commodity space framework) in Section 4. Later, we use the results obtained in Section 4 to prove the existence theorem in Section 5. Note that the equilibrium prices are F -measurable and thus, we need the results in Section 4 to establish the existence theorem. But, in the case of Walrasian expectations equilibrium, we deal with privately measurable allocations and if there are infinitely many states, then we are in an infinite dimensional commodity space framework. Thus, our analysis cannot be used to extend the existence of Walrasian expectations equilibrium in [16] to a differential information economy with Bayesian expected utilities and infinitely many states of nature.
Comparing with the existence result on maximin REE in [13] , our theorem applies to a more general economic model with an arbitrary finite measure space of agents and an arbitrary complete probability measure space as the space of states of nature, while the later applies only to an economic model which has finitely many agents and finitely many states of nature. The assumptions in our paper are similar to those in [13] , except the joint measurability and continuity of utility functions, and the joint measurability of the initial endowment function. The proof techniques in this paper are quite different from those in [13] . Since there are only finitely many agents and states of nature in the model considered in [13] , neither measurability nor continuity of utility functions and the initial endowment function plays any role in the proof of the existence of a maximin REE. Instead, the existence of a competitive equilibrium for complete information economies is applied. In contrast, both measurability and continuity of utility functions and the initial endowment function play key roles in this paper. To establish the existence theorem, techniques in [8] are adopted, measurability and continuity of the aggregate preferred correspondence are investigated. However, for special cases, the techniques can be simplified. For instance, if there are finitely many states of nature, one can still apply the approach employed in [13] and obtains an existence theorem. On the other hand, if there are finitely many agents, then one can show that the demand of each agent is F ⊗ B(Δ)-measurable and so is the aggregate demand. Then, an approach similar to that in the proof of Theorem 5.5 can be applied to establish the existence theorem. Further, since the space of states of nature in our model is an abstract probability space, our existence theorem does not depend on the dimension of the space of states of nature.
In [9] , Bhowmik and Cao used appropriate notions of properness to characterize Warasian expectations allocations in infinite dimensional commodity spaces. It would be interesting to known if those notions of properness can also be used to provide similar characterizations of maximin REE allocations in infinite dimensional commodity spaces. Recently, a general model of trade ex ante with differential information and uncertain delivery, in which there are finitely many agents and finitely many states of nature, was studied by Correia-da-Silva and Hervés-Beloso in [12] , and the existence of equilibrium is established. It would also be interesting to see whether the techniques in this paper can be used to extend the existence of equilibrium in [12] to the framework of infinitely many agents and infinitely many states of nature.
